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LUCIAN BLAGA: AN AMERICAN PRAGMATIST
IN EUROPE
Michael S. Jones

Liberty University, Virginia
Introduction
There is no contradiction between the assertion that Lucian Blaga
was an original thinker and the admission that the influence of
numerous other thinkers can be seen in his work. Blaga composed a
systematic philosophy whose single most striking feature may be its
creativity. Nonetheless, the influences of many preceding
philosophers are unmistakably evident in his opus. The neo-Kantian
aspects of Blaga’s philosophy are well documented.1 The NeoPlatonic elements, and, Blaga’s dispute with Stăniloae not
withstanding, the related influence of Orthodox theology and
Orthodox religion,2 virtually shout themselves to the non-Orthodox
reader. The similarities between Blaga’s philosophy of culture and

1

See G. G. Constandache, “Critique of the Unconscious: Kantian
Influences in the Works of Lucian Blaga.” Man and World 30 (1997):
445-452; Petru Ioan, “Matricea Kantiană a Filosofiei Lui Blaga.” Revista
de Filosofie 44 (1997): 213-221. Blaga alludes to the influence of Kant
and also of Marburg neo-Kantianism in his autobiography, Hronicul şi
cântecul vârstelor, vol. 6 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucureşti: Editura
Minerva, 1979), 129. Kant’s influence on Blaga is very clearly seen on
page 56 of Cultură şi cunoştiinŃă, where Blaga writes that the most
significant problem in the theory of knowledge is that of the categories.
Blaga devotes a whole chapter of this book to this problem, Lucian Blaga,
“Categoriile,” in Cultură şi cunoştiinŃă, vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga
(Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983).
2
On the influence of Orthodoxy, see Vasile Băncilă, Lucian Blaga,
energie românească, 2nd ed. (Timişoara, RO: Marineasa, 1995), 80.
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Spengler’s cultural morphology are well known.3 Many other
influences have been detected in Blaga’s philosophy as well.
Scholars have noted the parallel between Blaga’s differentials and
Leibniz’s monads,4 a possible relation between Blaga’s
epistemological modesty and the subjectivism of German
Romanticism,5 the important influence of Freud and Jung on
Blaga’s understanding of the subconscious,6 and even certain
similarities between Blaga’s thought and Indian philosophies.7
However, one very American aspect of Blaga’s philosophy seems
to have escaped notice by most of Blaga’s Romanian
commentators. This aspect is his epistemological Pragmatism. It is
the thesis of this article that Blaga’s philosophy contains all of the
elements necessary for him to be considered a pragmatist in the
American sense of the term.
In order to sustain this thesis, I will need to accomplish two
things. First, I must briefly describe what it means to be a
pragmatist in the context of American philosophy. Second, I must
show that Blaga’s philosophy fits this description.

3

Michael S. Jones, “Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture: More than a
Spenglerian Adaptation,” Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, seria
Philosophia, XLVIII: 1-2 (2003), 167-174; Alexandru Boboc, “Blaga,
Nietzsche si Spengler. Demersuri moderne asupra paradigmei <<stil>>,”
Seculum, serie noua, 1:3-4 (1995), 28-34.
4
Lucian Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, in vol. 11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga
(Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988), 95, 165ff.
5
Vasile Muscă, “Specificul creaŃiei culturale româneşti în câmpul
filosofiei” in Lucian Blaga – cunoaştere şi creaŃie (Bucharest: Cartea
Românească, 1987), 468-469.
6
Liviu Antonesei, “Repere pentru o filosofie a culturii,” in Ghise, Botez,
and Botez, Lucian Blaga – cunoaştere şi creaŃie, 402ff; Muscă,
“Specificul creaŃiei culturale româneşti în câmpul filosofiei,” 471, 473
7
Mircea Itu, Indianismul lui Blaga, (Braşov: Editura Orientul Latin,
1996); see also Lucian Blaga, Hronicul şi cântecul vârstelor, 174.
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Pragmatism Defined
Pragmatism is a school of thought. Like many schools of thought,
those thinkers who are considered to belong to this school differ
from each other on so many points that scholars have found it
difficult to single out exactly what elements are pragmatism’s
defining characteristics. There is a popular conception of
pragmatism as an attitude that espouses a practical approach to
resolving difficult or problematic situations. However, this simple
conception of pragmatism is not an adequate description of the
philosophical school that bears the name. As Philip Wiener has
observed, “We cannot simply equate the “pragmatic” with the
“practical” as is so commonly done by popular writers.”8
Pragmatism may be thought of as a school of philosophical
thought that is characterized by a set of attitudes and doctrines most
of which are shared by most of its proponents. In this, Pragmatism
is a “family resemblance” in the Wittgensteinian sense: not all of
the family traits are visible in every member of the family, but each
member bears enough of the traits in order to be recognized as
belonging to that family. John J. Stuhr, in the introduction to
Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy,9 discusses what
he considers to be the essential elements of classical American
Pragmatism. He lists the following seven themes that can be traced
through the writings of Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey,
and Mead: 1. Rejection of the practices and options that had
become the accepted tradition of modern philosophy. 2. A fallibilist
view of the human epistemic situation. 3. A pluralist view of human
8

Philip P. Wiener, “Pragmatism,” in The Dictionary of the History of
Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, Philip P. Wiener, ed. (New York:
Charles
Scribner's
Sons,
1973-74),
vol.
3,
553,
http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm. Viewed
4/1/2005.
9
John J. Stuhr, ed. Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy:
Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000, 1-7.
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experiences and values. 4. A radical empiricism in which it is
recognized that the subject is active (rather than passive) in
experience and that experience admits of no subject-object
distinction. 5. The methodological continuity of science and
philosophy as pragmatically justified experimental inquiries. 6. The
belief that one goal of philosophy should be the improvement of the
human situation. 7. An emphasis on the social context of all human
endeavors.
The details of this analysis of the core of Pragmatism could be
disputed. Most, and perhaps all, of the characteristics that Stuhr lists
can be found in other schools of philosophy. It might also be argued
that some of them might better be seen as secondary traits not
central to the movement. However, from these themes enumerated
and elaborated by Stuhr can be distilled a draught that flows from
the very headwaters of American Pragmatism. This draught is
epistemological by nature. The sine qua non of pragmatism is its
particular approach to the theory of knowledge.
Pragmatism’s Negative Element
The epistemology of American Pragmatism contains two essential
elements, one negative and the other positive. The negative element
is a response to the objectivist epistemological tradition of the
West. From Descartes through to 19th and 20th century Positivism,
and continuing in some figures in contemporary analytic and
phenomenological philosophy, the Western epistemological
tradition has pursued the goal of apodictic certainty and has sought
objective criteria of truth. Postmodern philosophy has gained fame
by repudiating this goal. However, even before Derrida, Foucault,
Lyotard, et al. pronounced the end of modernity, Pragmatists such
as James and Dewey had presented strong arguments showing that
beliefs are historically situated, that knowledge is a construct, and
that the criteria that one employs in making assessments of truth are
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subjective and contingent upon the perspective of the person doing
the assessing.10
Going against the current of epistemological objectivism,
Pragmatists have argued for a much more “modest” epistemology,
one that is more in keeping with human nature and the situation in
which we find ourselves. This is evident in James’ understanding of
the nature of truth. James embraces a multi-faceted theory that
combines correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic elements.11
According to James, the pragmatist view of truth is part of a
process-oriented epistemology that relates to a processmetaphysical world. Because the world is dynamic rather than
static, truth is changing, and therefore human beliefs must change
along with it. Therefore beliefs are necessarily both constructivist
and contextual: “...the absolute truth will have to be made, made as
a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verificationexperience... so far as reality means experienceable reality, both it
and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of
mutation – mutation towards a definite goal, it may be – but still
mutation.”12
This epistemological modesty in Pragmatism is also reflected in
Dewey’s instrumentalist approach to Pragmatism, the contextualism
of which is sensitive to the developing contexts of belief. Dewey
was aware of this, and saw it as a key feature of Pragmatism:
“‘pragmatism’ is, in its truth, just the fact that the empiricist does
10

Wiener emphasizes this anti-objectivist aspect of Pragmatism, 551-570.
There are places in James’ writing that seem to oppose the
correspondence theory of truth, but what he is really opposing in these
places is a view of the correspondence theory that assumes a static view of
reality. See James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking (New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1907), 198, 223; Charley
D. Hardwick and Donald A. Crosby, editors, Pragmatism, NeoPragmatism, and Religion: Conversations with Richard Rorty, (New
York: Peter Lang, 1997), 206.
12
James, Pragmatism, 224-5; see also Hardwick, 206.
11
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take account of the experienced ‘drift, occasion and contexture’ of
things experienced.”13 The constructivism of Dewey’s Pragmatism
is reflected in his bold statement: “... knowing is an act which
modifies what previously existed... its worth consists in the
consequences of the modification.”14
These same features are found in contemporary Pragmatism as
well. Richard Rorty, for example, speaks as a contextualist when he
states that “getting rid of ‘the view from nowhere’ – the idea of a
sort of knowing that has nothing to do with agency, values, or
interests – might have considerable cultural importance.”15 He
speaks as a constructivist when he argues that “every belief, no
matter how primitive or vicious, corresponds to some ‘world’ – the
‘world’ that contains the objects mentioned by the belief (Ptolemy’s
crystalline spheres or the subhuman nature of the slaves.)”16
Historicism and constructivism are the central themes of Joseph
Margolis’ book “Historied Thought, Constructed World.”17
Margolis’ perspectivism is clearly seen in his statement, “the choice
of truth-values (or truth-like values) assigned, as a matter of policy
or principle, to any sector of inquiry is a function, under symbiosis,
13

Dewey, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” in Stuhr, 459.
John Dewey, “The Quest for Certainty,” 245, quoted in Forrest Oran
Wiggins, “William James and John Dewey,” in The Personalist 23 (1942), 191.
15
Rorty, 45.
16
Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998, 1-2. In this passage Rorty is not
defending the correspondence theory of truth: on the contrary, he is
employing argumentum ad absurdum against it in order to substitute for
correspondence a (presumably) more pragmatic theory of truth, one that is
similar to Dewey’s instrumentalism. However, Rorty also argues that a
coherent theory of the nature of truth is not possible, and states that James
denied the correspondence theory (p.3). I consider both of these points
highly improbable. Regarding the latter, see James, Pragmatism, 198, 223.
17
Joseph Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Conceptual
Primer for the Turn of the Millennium. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995.
14
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of what we take to be the nature of the domain in question,” and
again, “Everything that exists and is real is socially constructed.”18
Pragmatism’s Positive Element
Counterbalancing this negative element of Pragmatism is a positive
element that is Pragmatism’s most noted feature: a de facto
criterion of truthfulness.19 The traditional criterion of truthfulness is
correspondence with reality: a proposition is true if what it asserts
corresponds to the way things actually are.20 However, how to
determine the truth of a proposition using the correspondence
criterion is quite a boondoggle: it may be just as difficult to
determine whether or not a proposition corresponds to reality as it is
to determine whether or not it is true. In essence, correspondence as
a criterion may be a begging of the question. As a result of this and
other considerations, correspondence as a criterion of truthfulness
has received much criticism,21 and alternative criteria have been
proposed.
The most prominent of these alternatives is coherence: a
proposition is taken to be true if it functions coherently within a
system of beliefs.22 Another theory, one that combines
correspondence and coherence, suggests that a proposition is known
to be true iff it can be shown to correspond to reality or is properly

18

Margolis, 65, 151.
Some contemporary pragmatists eschew the notion of criteria of
truthfulness as being a remnant of the supposedly “discredited
correspondence theory of truth” (Rorty, i) and therefore substitute notions
such as value in its place.
20
Brad Dowden and Norman Swartz, “Truth,” in James Fieser and
Bradley Dowden, ed., The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm#H3, viewed 4/6/2005.
21
See, for example, Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
22
Keith Lehrer, “Coherentism,” in Dancy and Sosa, 67-70.
19
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related to propositions that can be shown to correspond to reality.23
The former of these views seems to overlook the meaning of the
word truth in ordinary language; the later suffers from the same
question-begging shortcoming as does the coherence theory. A third
alternative is presented by deflationary theories of truth, which
view assertions of truthfulness not as descriptions but rather as
endorsements indicating what the speaker believes about the
proposition.24 However, this theory offers no criterion of
truthfulness.
Pragmatism offers a unique solution to the problem of criteria
of truthfulness. This solution honors the ordinary use of the term
“truth” and at the same time offers a criterion of truthfulness that
avoids begging the question. Pragmatism suggests that a
proposition is true if it succeeds when put into practice. In this
context, to succeed is to be useful in resolving cognitive or practical
problems, such as problems of scientific, technical, ethical, or
religious inquiry. Ideas are viewed as adaptive means of action;
therefore the propositions which express them are true only insofar
as they are able to adapt actions (and thoughts) to various
circumstances.
James did not reject correspondence and coherence as criteria
of truthfulness. However, he did observe that there are many truthcontexts in which neither empirical correspondence nor coherence
is appropriate. To James, these areas are among the most important
areas of human existence: religious practice, ethical decision,
aesthetic choice, etc.25 In these areas the criteria of “satisfaction”

23

See Susan Hack’s proposed “foundherentism,” in Timm Triplett, Recent
Work on Foundationalism, American Philosophical Quarterly 27 no. 2
(April 1990), 107-108.
24
Paul Horwich, “Theories of Truth,” in Dansy and Sosa, 511-514.
25
For James, “this entire spectrum of objective knowledge of matters of
fact merely provides the stage, setting and backdrop for the really
important issues of our lives. The important questions are not about
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and “power” are more appropriate.26 By “satisfaction” James means
expedience in a particular context. This is the most clearly
pragmatic area of James’ theory of truth. A belief is “true” (or taken
to be true, considered to be true) if it satisfies a person’s need to
perform a task at a particular time. James’ famous statement, “You
can say of it then either that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it
is true because it is useful.’ Both these phrases mean the same
thing...”27, expresses his view concisely.
James proposes a pragmatist approach to justification:
consequentialism. This approach encompasses evidential
justification where appropriate, but does not rely on it exclusively.
According to consequentialist justification, a belief is justified iff it
produces desirable consequences. If two competing beliefs both
produce desirable consequences, the one that produces the best
consequences is justified, or the one that produces desirable
consequences most reliably is justified. If a particular ethical
system can be seen to produce the best consequences, that ethical
system is justified. If religion produces desirable consequences that
would not be had without religion, then religion is justified.
Dewey’s “instrumentalism” is a pragmatist approach to
knowledge wherein knowing is viewed as an activity that is
directed towards the overcoming of the “problematic situations”
that arise during enquiry. Knowing is an experiment: conclusions
are tentative hypotheses that may be revised when a new
problematic is confronted. This is reflected in Dewey’s pragmatic
description of truth, “Just as to say an idea was true all the time is a
way of saying in retrospect that it has come out in a certain fashion,
so to say that an idea is “eternally true” is to indicate prospective
modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated. Its
matters of fact, but about our justification as persons and whether our lives
are worth living.” Hardwick, 210.
26
Hardwick, 212.
27
James, Pragmatism, 204.
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meaning, therefore, is strictly pragmatic. It does not indicate a
property inherent in the idea as intellectualized existence, but
denotes a property of use and employment.”28
In instrumentalism, ideas or thoughts are instruments that relate
experiences, making predictions possible, which guides actions.
These predictions (and consequent actions) are in turn tested by
other experiences, which show whether or not the actions are
expedient, and therefore whether the predictions were true. In this
scenario, “true” is seen to refer retrospectively to the value of ideas
or thoughts and predictions judged according to their effectiveness
in guiding actions expediently. A proposition, then, is taken to be
true if it is thought that it will effectively serve to predictively guide
actions, or retrospectively is taken to be true if it has been seen to
be an effective guide to actions.29
These views from early Pragmatism are reflected in the thought
of contemporary pragmatists. A pragmatic tendency is evident, for
instance, in W. V. Quine’s program of naturalized epistemology
when he writes: “But why all this creative reconstruction, all this
make-believe? …Why not just see how this construction really
proceeds? … If we are out simply to understand the link between
observation and science, we are well advised to use any available
information, including that provided by the very science whose link
with observation we are seeking to understand.”30 According to
Quine, the traditional projects of epistemology no longer offer any
hope of success, and the task that remains for epistemology is the
psychological one of analyzing how human cognition succeeds to
the degree that it does. The truth of cognition is evident in its

28

John Dewey, quoted in Stuhr, 436 (italics are Dewey’s).
Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’ Press,
1979), 175.
30
W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969, 75-76.
29

Lucian Blaga: An American Pragmatist in Europe

39

functionality: therefore the task of epistemology is not the
justification, but rather the explication, of our belief mechanisms.31
Although there are significant differences between Quine and
Rorty, Rorty also evidences this pragmatic view of justification.
“…the question ‘Do our practices of justification lead to truth?’ is
as unanswerable as it is unpragmatic. It is unanswerable because
there is no way to privilege our current purposes and interests. It is
unpragmatic because the answer to it would make no difference
whatever to our practice. But surely, it will be objected, we know
that we are closer to truth. Surely we have been making both
intellectual and moral progress. Certainly we have been making
progress, by our lights. That is to say, we are much better able to
serve the purposes we wish to serve, and to cope with the situations
we believe we face, than our ancestors would have been. But when
we hypostatise the adjective ‘true’ into ‘Truth’ and ask about our
relation to it, we have absolutely nothing to say.”32 Rorty’s point
seems to be that our beliefs are justified by their successes rather
than by their relationship to some abstract ideal of truth.
Thus we have seen that Pragmatism contains two seminal
moments, one negative and the other positive. We shall now see
that both of these key elements are present in the epistemology of
Lucian Blaga.
Blaga’s Philosophy
Blaga’s philosophical writings encompass a systematic philosophy
that includes most of the major divisions of modern philosophy.
This fact distinguishes Blaga from most American Pragmatists, who
tended to avoid constructing philosophical systems along the lines
of traditional philosophy. Furthermore, one of the most striking and
central features of Blaga’s system is his elaborate metaphysical
proposal. Although many of Blaga’s insights could stand on their
31
32

Quine, 82-83.
Rorty, 3-4.
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own without the support of his metaphysics, it is precisely the
metaphysics that binds the various elements of his philosophy
together as a system. This significantly separates Blaga from
American Pragmatists, since the great majority of Pragmatists have
disavowed speculative metaphysics in favor of what they see as a
more empirical and more practical focus to philosophy.33 Although
Blaga’s metaphysics does relate to the empirical and has significant
practical implications, it is perhaps best described as a conjectural
and suggestive heuristic.
However, although most Pragmatists have eschewed
speculative metaphysics, there have been exceptions. Peirce, for
example, held a metaphysical/epistemological view that included
“psycho-physical monism,” the belief that the physical universe is
essentially mind.34 Most American Pragmatists have espoused
metaphysical realism, either implicitly or explicitly, and although
they may refrain from elaborating metaphysical systems, this does
not protect them from the accusation of harboring metaphysical
views. Margolis’ previously-cited book, for example, can be read as
being precisely a (anti-metaphysical) metaphysics.35
These examples indicate that it is not the absence (or presence)
of speculative metaphysics that makes one a Pragmatist. Nor is it
the particular conclusions that one reaches in one’s philosophizing:
Pragmatists range from left to right across the range of
33

Stuhr, 3.
Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2001 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/peirce/>.
Viewed
4/24/2005.
35
In support of this interpretation, it need only be noted that Margolis
considers the following metaphysical assertion to be the first of six
“master themes” from his book: “There is no principled difference
between the world (the world as it is, independent of our inquiry) and the
intelligible world (the world as it appears to us to be). Call that doctrine
symbiosis.” Margolis, 300.
34
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philosophical issues. Rather it is the presence of the aforementioned
two elements, one negative and the other positive, in one’s
epistemology that qualifies one as a Pragmatist in the American
sense. Therefore in spite of the prominence of metaphysics in
Blaga’s philosophy, if these two elements can be shown to be
present in Blaga’s epistemology, one may say that, in his
epistemology if not in his philosophical tradition, Blaga is a
Pragmatist.
A Similar Negative Element in Blaga’s Epistemology
That there is a prominent and very important epistemological
modesty in Blaga’s theory of knowledge is doubtless very well
known by all who have studied Blaga’s philosophy. Both
epistemological and metaphysical considerations lead Blaga to
assert that “positive-adequate cognition” is not humanly possible.36
Epistemologically, Blaga analyzes cognition into the following
seven theoretically possible “modes”: 1. Positive-adequate
cognition. 2. Quasi-cognition. 3. Negative cognition. 4. Cognition
which is in part positive-adequate and in part quasi-cognition. 5.
Cognition which is in part positive-adequate and in part negative
cognition. 6. Cognition which is in part positive-adequate, in part
quasi-cognition, and in part negative cognition. 7. Cognition which
is in part quasi-cognition and in part negative cognition.37
According to Blaga’s analysis, only the second (quasi-cognition)
and the seventh (part quasi- and part negative-cognition) of these
modes are humanly realizable. The first mode listed, positiveadequate cognition, is realized by the Great Anonymous.
36

Blaga’s term “positive-adequate cognition” refers to that mode of
cognition that accurately grasps its object in all of the object’s aspects and
details. Blaga also refers to this as "absolute cognition." Using language
common in analytic philosophy, positive-adequate cognition would be
described as that cognition which has a 100% correspondence to its object.
37
Lucian Blaga, Cenzura Transcendentă in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983), 545-6; see also 529ff.
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Blaga articulates an interesting argument for the thesis that
humans do not have positive-adequate cognition. In brief, his
argument is that, by definition, cognition is an act wherein the
subject surpasses itself in possessing the cognitive object. By
definition a phenomenon is an existence centered in itself.
Therefore cognition cannot be a phenomenon. This leaves two
possible conclusions regarding cognition: either it is something
paradoxical, an existent non-phenomenon, or it does not exist.
Blaga favors the latter conclusion, and argues that all human
“cognition” is mere quasi-cognition, either distorting its objects or
incomplete in its grasp of them.38
One of the most interesting parts of Blaga’s philosophy is his
discussion of specific modes of cognition permitted to humanity in
order to allow humans to approach the unknown, to cognize
mystery. These are the three forms of “luciferic cognition.” These
approaches do not eliminate mystery, but they allow a deeper
understanding of mystery or an accumulation of information about
the mysterious.39 The preservation of mystery even in luciferic
cognition is another indication of Blaga’s epistemological modesty.
Another important aspect of Blaga’s epistemology is its
constructivism. Constructivism, the view that human knowledge is
a human construction, is an ubiquitous element of Blaga’s
philosophy. This open acceptance of constructivism is seen in his
freely creative metaphysics. It is also reflected in his epistemology
in the role accorded to culture and in the analyses of mythic, occult,
paradisiac, and luciferic cognition. That human knowledge would
be a human creative construct is no surprise once one understands
Blaga’s metaphysics. The human destiny to be a creator, ever
provoked to this effort by the abilities and limits given to
humankind by the Great Anonymous, leaves no option but that
38

Blaga, Cenzura Transcendentă, 505-6.
See Lucian Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983).
39
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humanity will strive to cognize the unknown without ever quite
reaching it. This scenario sounds macabre, but seen from within
Blaga’s metaphysics it becomes a gift to humankind and to
creation: to humankind, because it gives humanity purpose and
pleasure; to creation, because it perpetuates creativity while at the
same time protecting creation from potential self-destruction.
There have been numerous other constructivist philosophers,
and it cannot be said that Blaga was the first. Nonetheless, there are
several important things about Blaga’s constructivism that make it
particularly noteworthy. The first of these is how neatly and
consistently constructivism fits within the larger philosophical
picture that Blaga paints. Blaga’s philosophical system gives
constructivism a context, an explanation, and a purpose that are
sometimes lacking in other constructivist philosophies. A second
noteworthy aspect of Blaga’s constructivism is that it is argued for
in a wide variety of cognitive contexts: Blaga shows that human
thought is constructivist whether it occurs in math, in the natural
sciences, in philosophy, in theology, in the arts, or in any other
cognitive context.40 A third important aspect of Blaga’s
constructivism is how it is argued: Blaga does not cease being a
constructivist when he argues for his own philosophical system. He
views his own system as merely a possible thesis supported (but not
proved) by evidence and pragmatic utility. Therefore he does not
seek a foundationalist justification of his system: he argues for his
system using evidences and illustrations taken from a wide variety
of intellectual domains, and by showing the fruitfulness of his
proposals for further philosophical research. He does not try to
prove his system beyond all possible doubt. Were he to attempt to
40

See Traian Pop, “InteligenŃă şi intuiŃie în cunoaştere,” in Introducere în
filosofia lui Lucian Blaga, 141-146. Although each of these modes of
cognition is unique in comparison to the others, they also share certain
elements, including constructivism, and Blaga considers them to be
equally valid ways of approaching mystery, Blaga, FiinŃa istorică, in vol.
11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucureşti: Editura Minerva, 1988), 508.
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show that his theory is apodictically certain, he would be
inconsistent with his own system. However, that he does not argue
for the certainty of his system does not indicate that he does not
believe his system to be correct. On the contrary, it indicates that he
views his system as correct, and that because it is correct, he must
conduct his philosophizing as a constructivist, which entails
viewing his own system as a human construct.
The idea that human cognitive ability is limited is not at all
new. Much more interesting is Blaga’s explanation of these limits
and his hypothesis about their source and purpose. According to
Blaga, both the ability of human cognition and the limits imposed
upon this ability are results of the “grace” extended to creation and
the care exercised over creation by the Great Anonymous. The
purpose of these measures is the protection, preservation, and
promotion of creation. Individual cognition is permitted within very
specific limits: when knowledge is of a type that is “positiveadequate” it is strictly limited with regard to its extent. When
knowledge is of a type that is in principle unlimited, it is strictly
censored in regard to its accuracy.41 Blaga’s term for this limitation
is “transcendent censorship.” This censorship fulfills the purpose of
the Great Anonymous of spurring human creativity, providing an
outlet to this inner human yearning, and at the same time preserving
the order of the cosmos. Blaga poignantly suggests that these limits
imposed upon cognition both shape cognition and facilitate its
fruitfulness.42
In Blaga’s metaphysics there are two important measures
employed by the source of the cosmos in preservation of cosmic
equilibrium. One of these has already been discussed: transcendent
censorship. The other is differentiated creation, the main subject of
41

This is discussed at length in Cenzura transcendentă and more briefly
on 529ff of Cunoaşterea luciferică.
42
Blaga, Cenzura transcendentă, 461: “Although water fights against the
riverbanks, without the banks the river would no longer be a river.”
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his book “Divine Differentials”.43 Blaga hypothesizes that the
human epistemological predicament is an intentional result of the
way that the creator (The Great Anonymous) formed the world. The
creator formed (and forms) the world through the emanation of
what Blaga calls “differentials.” These are the fundamental matter
of the universe, the combination of which creates all that we
know.44 The Great Anonymous regulates the types of differentials
that are emanated and how the differentials combine in order to
assure that they do not jeopardize the well being of creation.45 Since
the continued supreme governance of the Great Anonymous is
essential to the well being of the cosmos, part of this regulating
involves the limiting of all aspects of creation so that no rival to the
Great Anonymous may arise. For this reason human cognition is
regulated and limited. This is Blaga’s metaphysical explanation of
the limits of human cognition, a creative and illuminating, even if
not highly scientific, theory.
A Similar Positive Element in Blaga’s Epistemology
The negative element in Pragmatism is counterbalanced by an
equally important positive element: the pragmatic criterion of
truthfulness. Blaga’s epistemological modesty is also
counterbalanced by a significant and well-developed theory of the
criteria of truthfulness. Like James, Blaga’s theory retains
correspondence in his definition of truth46 and coherence as a
criterion of truthfulness.47 He observes that internal criteria of
43

Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine.
Blaga states that the substance of the differentials is not an empirical
substance. The differentials are more basic than quanta, which are
complex energy entities and are composed of differentials. All material,
psychical, and spiritual entities are composed of differentials. Blaga,
DiferenŃialele divine, 95-96.
45
Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 77.
46
Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică, 381.
47
Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică, 381.
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verification are limited to showing that a theory cannot be verified:
coherence never serves as a positive mode of verification. Therefore
it seems that Blaga views coherence as a necessary but not
sufficient criterion of truthfulness. Correspondence, on the other
hand, seems to be viewed by Blaga as a sufficient but not necessary
criterion of truth. If a statement can be shown to correspond to what
it is describing, it stands as verified, but the inability to show that
this relation pertains does not falsify a statement.
A difficulty with correspondence as a criterion of truth is how
the relationship of correspondence is verified. Blaga is definitely
concerned that statements have the correct relationship to “external”
reality, but he is aware that verifying this relationship is
problematic,48 and consists of a tentative evaluation based upon the
success or failure of the statement when put into application. Thus
while Blaga may have a correspondence theory of truth, he clearly
disavows correspondence as a criterion of verification.49
In discussing his own theory of truth, Blaga writes, “The
external criterion consists in a relation of the theory to plan A
48

See especially Blaga, Geneza metaforei şi sensul culturii (Bucureşti:
FundaŃia pentru Literatură şi Artă “Regele Carol II”, 1937), 417, “There
certainly exists a nominal definition of truth, understood as the equation
between an idea and reality. But this ideal definition is equivalent to a
simple postulate, for the realization of which no certainty is given to us,
nor any criteria of judgement nor possibility of a test.”
49
Also on page, 409 of Cunoaşterea luciferică he writes, "Let us
presuppose that in truth there exists a 'reality in itself'… The single thing
which can be affirmed about knowledge in relation to a reality in itself is
that we cannot know whether knowledge is able to contain reality in itself,
nor whether it is not." While Blaga admits some importance to a
correspondence between propositions and that which they are attempting
to describe, his advocating of the theory of transcendent censorship proves
that he does not believe that a proposition can ultimately correspond to
reality (whatever that would entail). This is made clear in Cenzura
transcendentă 506, where he describes cognition as a “catching hold of”
an object, and says that such an act is only incompletely possible.
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effectively realized.”50 The phrase “effectively realized” hints at his
solution to the problem of criteria of truthfulness and the
verification of correspondence: there is a distinctly pragmatic aspect
to Blaga’s view of verification. His criterion for judging
correspondence is pragmatic, as is seen in his statement,
“Verifiability consists, as was proved, in the ‘actualization’ of the
empirical potential of a theory. This signifies something completely
different than the correspondence of the theory to a ‘reality in
itself.’”51 Blaga seems to be aware of the circularity of proposing
correspondence as both the definition of truth and the criterion of
truthfulness. He appears to avoid this by proposing that the criterion
according to which a proposition should be accepted as
corresponding to reality and therefore as true is how effective the
proposition is when put into practice. This is remarkably like the
criterion of truthfulness advocated by American Pragmatists.
That a pragmatic criterion is in fact what Blaga advocates can
be seen from his own practice. Blaga does not philosophize like
Socrates, proceeding dialectically, nor like Descartes, attempting to
build a philosophical system upon some infallible first premise(s).
Blaga philosophizes by suggesting new theories and then showing
their fruitfulness. It is this fruitfulness, in Blaga’s eyes, that
vindicates many of his most significant proposals. When in his
epistemology Blaga proposes the theory of “plus cognition” and
then argues for the truth of his theory by reference to its success in
explaining the intellectual process employed in numerous scientific
advances, he is utilizing a pragmatic criterion of truthfulness.52
When in his metaphysics Blaga proposes that the cosmos and its
teleology are best explained by a system that posits the existence of
an intelligent creator as the source of the universe, and then
50

Cunoaşterea luciferică, 381.
Cunoaşterea luciferică, 409. The italicization of empirical potential and
the quotes around “reality in itself” are Blaga’s.
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Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică, 357, 358, 366, 374, 418.
51

48

Michael S. Jones

supports this hypothesis by showing its rich and extensive
explanatory power, his argument utilizes the pragmatic theory of
verification.53
This same approach to verification is seen in Blaga's
philosophy of science. In one passage, commenting on the nature of
scientific progress, he writes, “With what right does he (Einstein)
transform a 'paradoxical finding' into a 'principle'? With one single
right. With the right that is given to him by the theoretical fruits
which this change of accent has been able to bear.”54 There may be
times when science proceeds via the gradual accumulation and
analysis of data, and when one scientific theory overturns a
previously accepted one by means of this process. However, it is
very often the case that scientific data is open to more than one very
plausible interpretation. In the latter case, a criterion other than
correspondence is needed to determine which theory is most valid.
In such a situation a scientific theory is not accepted as true because
it corresponds to reality and rival theories do not: that would be
question-begging. In this situation a theory is accepted as true
because it is seen that it works.55

53

Blaga, Cenzura transcendentă, 450, "Forced to choose between
incomplete justifications, we can make a concession to the critic, namely
that of viewing the proposition of the Great Anonymous as a simple point
of view. The value of this point of view will be measured through the
results which it has the gift to bring."
54
Blaga, ŞtiinŃă şi creaŃie , in vol. 10 of Opere (Bucureşti: FundaŃia
Regală, 1946), 162.
55
This is admittedly an oversimplification of the pragmatic criterion.
There are complications: theories can work without being true, and there
are other important factors that influence the acceptance of a scientific
theory. This oversimplification, for purposes of succinctness, is mine, not
Blaga’s. Blaga is aware that pragmatic validation is not inerrant, and
argues that pragmatic successes are sometimes achieved using erroneous
premises, see FiinŃa istorică, 465.
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Conclusion
It may seem rather far-fetched to argue that Blaga, a very
Continental philosopher whose works contain few references to
American Pragmatism, is himself a Pragmatist. It may seem that
such a project is the folly of an American philosopher who wants to
impose his own tradition onto another’s work. Nonetheless, I think
that this article shows that a strong argument for the Pragmatism of
Blaga’s epistemology can be made.
The two essential features of American Pragmatism are its
repudiation of epistemological strategies that aim at apodictic
certainty and its proposal of a pragmatic criterion of truthfulness.
Any philosopher who does not share these two features is not a
Pragmatist. Likewise, any philosopher who does embrace them can
be regarded, at least in his or her epistemology, as a Pragmatist.
Blaga rejects the goal of apodictic certainty on a number of
grounds. He also advocates a pragmatic criterion of truthfulness.
Therefore Blaga is (can be considered) a Pragmatist.
Pragmatism is currently experiencing a revival in America.
New arguments have been formulated in its support, and its
proponents include many of America’s leading philosophers. That
Blaga embraced a similar philosophy more than half a century ago
reflects his insight as a philosopher. Perhaps his works contain
other insights that would be useful to contemporary philosophy as
well.

